University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Great Plains Quarterly

Great Plains Studies, Center for

1993

Unplighted Troths: Causes for Divorce in a Frontier Town Toward
The End of the Nineteenth Century
C. Robert Haywood
Washburn University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly
Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons

Haywood, C. Robert, "Unplighted Troths: Causes for Divorce in a Frontier Town Toward The End of the
Nineteenth Century" (1993). Great Plains Quarterly. 737.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/737

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

UN PLIGHTED TROTHS
CAUSES FOR DIVORCE IN A FRONTIER TOWN
TOWARD THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

C. ROBERT HAYWOOD

"Welcome

national social values and mores that later generations would label Victorian. As a mecca for
free-spending cowboys it was a place to let off
steam, live high, and have fun. For the merchants, gamblers, joint operators, and cattlemen it was a time to fleece the unwary, reap
handsome profits, and grow respectably rich.!
But not for everyone. Mary Sawyer needed a
divorce--desperately needed to be free of the
marital trap she found herself in. She was confined to a sick bed in a dugout where the damp,
crumbling walls provided shelter "little better
than living outside." Her husband swore at her,
falsely accused her of adultery, refused to provide adequate food or fuel, and neglected her at
the most critical point of her illness. For Mary
Sawyer, the crucial questions relating to Dodge
City were would the local courts in this maledominated setting where women were seen in
the courtroom only in the dock or on rare occasions in the spectator's gallery, provide a remedy for her plight? And, if so, on what grounds?2
For the rest of the United States, contradicting the stereotypical conception of ironclad
marriages and compliant, even beleaguered,
Victorian wives, divorce rates rose rapidly in
the last half of the nineteenth century, jumping

to Dodge City, the biggest,
wildest, wickedest little city on the continent,"
was the exuberant greeting given out-of-town
visitors to Dodge's Fourth ofJuly celebration in
1883. The assessment projected was a selfcongratulatory one shared and frequently envied by the rest of the United States. Dodge was
enjoying the peak of its cattle-town fame and
prosperity as the quintessential frontier boom
town, unrestrained by convention, the "very
embodiment of waywardness and wantonness."
Few communities seemed more at odds with the
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almost eighty percent in the United States in
the decade of the 1870s. Mary perhaps knew
that the West led the other sections in this
increase and Kansas ranked well up among the
leading states. 3 Kansas supported liberal statutes
and generous judicial interpretations of what
constituted grounds for divorce. The earliest
divorce law in territorial Kansas made provisions for nine causes of dissolution, which included such open, catch-all phrases as "shall
offer such indignities to the person ... of the
other as shall render his or her condition intolerable."4 The statutes applying during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century had expanded
to ten the causes for granting a divorce. Although omitting the nebulous "intolerable condition" clause, the newer statutes replaced it
with an equally flexible expression, "gross neglect of duty."5 District courts could and did
grant divorce for anyone or any combination of
the ten reasons. Ford County, with Dodge City
the county seat in 1874, was served by the
Sixteenth District Court and, like more than
three hundred other citizens of the town and its
environs between 1874 and 1900, Mary Sawyer
brought her petition to the District Court. 6
The rapidly rising national divorce rate was
not initiated by the changing laws, however, but
was, like the laws themselves, a reflection of
society's changing understanding of the duties
of marriage partners. Women's rights were expanded during this period and women took
advantage of changed attitudes to free themselves from unfortunate unions. Approximately
seventy percent of all divorce cases in the
United States were initiated by women (70.3
percent in the Dodge City district). These spiraling numbers, according to Robert L. Griswold,
were "an accurate barometer of rising marital
expectations" on the part of women. Men found
the causes women used in seeking dissolution of
marriages equally serviceable justifications for
ending their own untenable unions. Perhaps
Mary Sawyer would have sought the court's
remedy earlier if she had known that female
petitioners were usually favorably received by
these all-male bastions of justice. Nationally,
women received approximately two-thirds of

the divorces granted, 34.2 percent for husbands
to 65.8 percent for wives. In Dodge women did
even better, winning 69.5 percent of the cases. 7
The new perception of family life saw marriage as involving mutual love and respect in
what was to be an economically and sexually
compatible partnership to undergird procreation and shared child-nurturing. A husband in
such an arrangement was obligated to be a
caring and considerate companion who provided for the physical comforts of wife and
children; the wife's reciprocal role was to provide moral guidance for all in the family, nurture the children, look after the home, and
cheerfully submit to the husband in all reasonable demands in other matters. s Although the
bargain seemed tipped in the husband's favor,
the woman's position of moral superiority over
men made her, as one western Kansas newspaper put it, "the inspiration of all good works,"9
and, consequently, the recipient of great respect
and discreet behavior from the husband in and
away from the home, even though public life
clearly reflected male domination.
The details of what this domestic relationship ought to be were often hammered out, not
in the glorifying, ethereal rhetoric of women's
magazines and other uplifting literature, but in
the bitter, even nasty confrontations of the
divorce court. Godey's Lady's Book could describe the moral and spiritual infusion of the
mother as the "light of the home," a loving,
caring, and calming companion, but when John
H. Cane, in the district court held in Dodge
City, charged his wife, Sally, with being "a
woman of temper, of a cold and cruel disposition
... easily provoked and angered, which caused
him to leave home to keep from bearing her
abuse" while she was "twitting him" and "aggravating him," the court might agree that her
behavior was "outrageous," but it was not a
deviation so far from the norms of her duty as
to justify divorce. On the other hand, when
John used "profane and indecent language in
the presence of the children," beat his wife with
a broomstick, and failed to provide decent
housing when he had the opportunity, the
court found he had not fulfilled his duties as a
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husband and granted Sally a divorce that provided an equitable division ofland and property
(3770).10 It was from such distinctions, aired in
public, that the weighing of wifely and husbandly
duty was spelled out with full legal and societal
sanctions behind them. The District Court in
Dodge was to have ample opportunity ro deal
with the distinctions.
Divorce came to the citizens of Dodge during
the last half of the nineteenth century like the
common cold, respecting neither class nor financial standing. The two leading merchants,
Robert M. Wright and Charles Rath, and their
wives found themselves in court, as did many
men and women who were so poverty stricken
they could nQt travel even short distances to
contest the proceedings. The wives of the lawyers, real estate men, and physicians-men possessing the best education the community could
boast (for example, Frederick T. M. Wenie, C.
S. Williams, and Harry E. Gryden)-had the
same dubious honor of being divorcees as did
Tinnie Dibrow, who signed her petition with
an X. Most divorce cases concerned obscure
"little people," but Dodge City's most noted or
notorious woman, Dora Hand, lost her life in a
much publicized accident when she came back
to Dodge in quest of a divorce from her adulterous husband.
Of 224 petitions filed between 1874 and
1900 that are available for review, the records
show that 139 cases were acted upon in favor of
the plaintiff, six for the defendant, and seventeen were continued or dismissed, including
one case involving a common law marriage
(3657). As for the rest, the record is unclear. In
making these decisions the plaintiffs and the
courts dealt primarily with five of the ten causes
provided for in the state constitution.
As listed in Article 28, Sec. 6258, the grounds
for divorce were the following.
"First, when either of the parties had a former
husband or wife living at the time of the subsequent marriage." No cases on record.
"Second, abandonment for one year." This
cause was cited in 54.4 percent of cases and was
the sole cause in thirty-six. The one-year absence requirement was a liberalization of the
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two-year requirement provided in the original
statutes adopted in 1855. The hardship suffered
by a spouse and family during an extended
absence and the improvement of transportation
on the frontier, making travel easier and quicker,
indicated that a change in the law was needed.
But even more important was the alteration of
society's domestic ideology to stress the joint
obligation of husband and wife to a marriage.
When the prescribed duties were broken, as
they most surely were when a spouse deserted
the family, divorce became a benign remedy to
be applied as soon as reasonably possibleY If
there was a question of return or reconciliation,
the court did not hesitate to place limits on the
conditions for granting the final decree, and, by
statute, the decree would only become "absolute and take effect" at the end of six months.
As was true for the rest of the United States,
abandonment was the ground most frequently
cited by Dodge City plaintiffs. Between 1867
and 1886 in the United States, 75,191 women
and 51,485 men indicated desertion as cause for
divorcej in Kansas the difference was much
greater, 4974 women to 2217 menY Usually
other instances of the breakdown in roles were
cited, but abandonment was the one cause for
divorce that usually was met by a sympathetic
court and the one that most frequently stood
alone. Obviously an absent husband or wife
could not fulfill the acceptable Victorian role.
Once the absence was proven, or uncontested,
the only matters in contention were determining if the plaintiff were at fault in causing the
desertion, the allotment of alimony, the assignment of the custody of children, the restoration
of prior names, and the division of property.
Generally the plaintiff had only to demonstrate that the guilty partner had not been
present in the home for more than twelve
months. Noah Newland went for a visit to Ohio
and never came back (3264)j C. C. Christal, in
failing health, came West in search of a more
salubrious climate and could not persuade his
wife to join him (3197)j and ]. W. Coleman
"fled the country" to escape charges of incest
(3723). Other cases were not so clear: at least
two railroad men claimed they were forced by
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their job to move frequently and could not get
home. Emmet Sherwood's use of that defense
was judged spurious, however, when he also
confessed he had sent no money home for over
a year (3813). The court granted his wife the
divorce plus a $1000 single alimony payment
and eventually garnished his wages to pay court
costs. Lettie Sugg and Amanda Adams successfully defended themselves from the charge of
abandoning their husbands when they demonstrated that they had been forced to return to
their families to escape their husbands' abuse
(3318,2843).
The court's sympathy was clearly with any
woman whose husband had neglected his role as
provider, but a wife's abandonment of her husband was also considered gross neglect of duty.
The plight of the wife and family with no
provider, however, was many times heartrendingly desperate and the court took cognizance of the fact.
Women's citations of abandonment, curiously in light of present-day understanding of a
wife's right to employment and a career, were
accompanied by a litany of complaints regarding the husband's failure in his major duty as
provider, which "forced," "compelled," or "necessitated" the wife to become gainfully employed, frequently outside the home. Sarah
Foster spoke for a number of wives when she
complained that after her husband left her she
was "compelled to take in washing" (3732). But
even if the husband did not stray, wives who
were required to work felt abused if they were
forced to neglect household duties. Mary Ann
Kimmel and the court found "extream curuelty"
in being forced to work in the family laundry
"from 6 0' clock in the morning until 11 o'clock
at night" to the near total neglect of her duties
and, to add to the harm, to have her husband
appropriate the money earned (2313). Others
found it necessary to take in boarders, do sewing, serve as nurse, or "go out to service." A
husband's failure to provide subsistence not
only rendered the family destitute but put the
woman's chances of succeeding as wife and
mother in jeopardy when she had to assume the
husband's rightful role as well. There was no

instance when a wife's working was by itself
alone considered cause enough for divorce, but
many women used a description of the hardship
involved to prove the marriage's failure.
"Third, adultery." The charge of adultery was
part of the divorce proceedings in 17.5 percent
of the cases and was the only cause cited in
eight cases. The pattern for the rest of the
United States during the 1867-86 period was
not quite so clear with 38,184 husbands charging adultery while 29,502 wives made the same
complaint. In Kansas the pattern gave a better
than two to one edge for husbands making the
charge.13 Just as the proof of abandonment was
the quickest and most certain path to a successful divorce for women, men found that proof of
adultery brought the same sure and rapid decision. During Dodge's early years as a roistering
cattle town, men more frequently used the
charge than they did in the 1890s, and the
husband was more readily believed, as was
Israel La Montaine when he declared his wife
was "practicing the nefarious business of a whore"
(142), Thomas Cooper, who reported that his
wife "for over one year last past [was] a common
Harlot [in a Dodge City brothel] committing
adultery with many persons at diverse
times" (161), and Daniel Knox, who reported his
wife to be a "notorious prostitute in one of the
Dance Halls" (166). Such cases took little of the
court's time.
Adultery, however, was usually committed
in less public places and, consequently, the
charges carried greater detail as to where, when,
and with whom (86, 113, 189, 225, 3089).
Depositions from neighbors or the adulterer's
partner apparently were not difficult to secure,
and in those instances where the defendant did
not appear before the court, the statements of
the plaintiff alone were accepted as proof. One
long-suffering husband presented nothing more
than his statement that he had not seen his wife
for "four years preceding the birth of a child,"
thus neatly tying abandonment with adultery
(197).
Wives did not charge adultery as often as
men and in only one case was it the only cause
a woman cited--even then the petitioner noted

DIVORCE IN A FRONTIER TOWN

that because of her husband's actions he had
given her a "loathsome disease" (968). Most
named names, dates, and places and the most
distressing petitions were those in which the
episodes occurred in the plaintiffs' homes (43,
211,968,3722). When the wife listed the cause
as a major contention, the court rarely failed to
grant her a divorce or to restore her maiden
name and custody of children.
Society considered falsely charging a wife
with adultery particularly degrading and the
courts deemed it the worst form of mental
cruelty, destroying health as surely as any
physical disease. 14 Victorian concepts of the
"true woman" placed high value on married
virtue, and for a man to impugn his wife's
character fal~ely was particularly damning. A
Texas judge stated: "Of all the treasures cherished by a woman, her reputation for chastity is
the dearest. 'It is the immediate jewel of her
soul'; and when an attempt is made by her
husband, who should be her protector, to rob
her of it; cruelty has reached its utmost limit."15
By further implication, a woman wrongly accused might be placed in harm's way since
lustful men might be encouraged to act on the
allegation, and, on a more prosaic level, the
woman in question and those associated with
her could suffer personal and financial loss
because respectable people would shun them.
Jobs could be lost and other economic opportunities denied. All of these possibilities were
aired in the Dodge City court.
SuIt ina J. Averill alleged that the false accusations of adultery made by her husband were
designed to force her to leave the community so
that he could control their lands and lumber
yard (3375). In a cross petition Emma Alter
claimed her husband, "a stingy and miserly"
man, had bribed her own brother to spy on her
and then falsely accused her of being an adulteress in order to defraud her of her property by
forcing her to return to Ohio (3756). Amanda
Adams was also able to free herself from such a
charge by proving she had left her husband only
temporarily to aid a sister. She had intended to
return and was never involved with any other
man (2843). The court awarded the divorce to
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her along with custody of the children and the
requirement that her husband pay court costs
and the legal fee of $10.00 (2843). When William Ingram presented a counter petition reiterating his charges of unfaithfulness after his
wife had condemned his false accusations, the
court supported her description of his "insane
jealousy" and awarded her a substantial property settlement (3543).
On a number of occasions the husband's false
charges included incest, which the courts judged
to be even more cruel. Jennie M. Zwich's account of her husband's false charge that she had
had sexual intercourse with her father was
deemed to constitute both physical and mental
cruelty since both she and her father suffered
public shame, disgrace, and physical collapse.
Adultery and incest were charges that could
easily backfire without ample proof and even
then the court's reaction was uncertain. One
judge found the provable charge of "a dissolute
character" of a wife keeping a bawdy house in
Wichita no cause for divorce because the husband "knew the woman's character when he
married her" (3827). A local newspaper, in one
of its rare comments on divorce proceedings,
praised the judge's action as an endorsement of
"the sanctity of the marriage VOWS."16
With that strange double standard of the
time, newspapers rarely mentioned divorce litigation except to list the case. Editor Nicholas B.
Klaine of the Dodge City Times admitted that his
paper avoided reporting on trials that had too
many "racy features" because a "moral paper"
ought not "shock the readers with details."17
Such sensitivity, however, was not shown in
reporting other instances of the peccadilloes
and high life of Front Street. In Dodge City
society appeared to condone the necessity of
divorce but regretted the unpleasantness of
sexually explicit discussion in public of what
people already were gossiping about in private.
The untarnished, morally superior wife in the
home was the very foundation of the Victorian
social order, and official reporting avoided besmirching the image.
"Fourth, impotency." There is no instance of
this condition being used as even a minor cause
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by a plaintiff. In spite of the blatant display of
advertisements in the papers for nostrums designed to cure the condition, leading a reader to
speculate that impotency had reached epidemic
proportions, attorneys and their clients found it
of little use as a cause for divorce.
"Fifth, when wife, at the time of marriage,
was pregnant by another than her husband."
This was one of the rarely used statutory causes
for divorce. Mattie Stein in her petition admitted to being pregnant at the time of marriage
but condemned her husband for making a false
charge that the child was "a bastard child"
which caused her "great mental agony and
distress." Apparently to strengthen her case,
she added adultery to the charge (3744). Bertha
E. Butts provided an interesting twist in admitting she was pregnant at the time of her
marriage. Since she was under age of lawful
consent, her husband married her to "escape
criminal prosecution" and had reviled her,
calling her a "G- D-- D- D- whore," which
caused "great mental and physical suffering"
and a miscarriage (3524). Without a confession
from the wife, prior pregnancy by another man
was hard to prove and attorneys apparently
advised using other more common grounds for
action.
"Sixth, extreme cruelty." Next to abandonment, cruel or abusive behavior was the most
frequent cause appearing in women's petitions.
It was at least one of the causes cited in sixty-one
cases and the sole cause in eight. Most descriptions of a husband's cruelty were straightforward enough: the husband choked, struck,
kicked; beat with fists, sticks, clubs, or other
handy household articles; and threatened murder, occasionally with gun in hand. With the
changes by mid-century of society's understanding of family and gender roles, duties, and
acceptable behavior, women's charge of mental
cruelty gained a more sympathetic hearing in
the courts.
The "true woman," it was believed, ought
not be subjected to brutish behavior, excessive
or aberrant sexual demands, indecent language, ridicule before strangers, or other action
that might trigger nervous disorders. Women's

reaction to such stressful conditions were
lumped under the medical term neurasthenia,
which had by 1890 become "a part of the
modern medical landscape." Although an illdefined ailment, associated particularly with
middle-class women in modern, urbanized settings, it was considered physically debilitating,
and if unchecked, deadly. Nervous exhaustion
from whatever cause was understood to have
the power to destroy health and in effect become a physical disorder. IS The courts in Dodge
City reflected this changed understanding, and
women as plaintiffs increasingly included mental cruelty in their petitions. In describing the
effect of such behavior, women and, on rare
occasions, men, used such terms as "causing ...
great mental agony" (3744), "great mental
pain" (3732), "mental distress before friends"
(3722), and "suffering nervous prostrations"
(3797). Vile and abusive language was particularly noted as a nerve-shattering offense. Victoria Mills charged her husband with "never
having a kind word" for her and said he often
called her vile names such as "damned bitch"
(3711). Edward R. Steward brought similar
charges against his wife, who called him vile
names, hit him with an iron rasp, and threatened him with "a 40-4 revolver" (3730). Both
men and women petitioners cited vile and profane language and name-calling as evidence of
the breakdown of a marriage. Apparently Dodge
City believed that the roles of both spouses
called for civility and respect and that offensive
language indicated that the relationship had
been irreparably lost.
The Kansas Supreme Court in 1883 (Carpenter v. Carpenter) reversed the previous court's
position that specific proof had to be presented
to show alleged mental cruelty had caused
physical suffering, and the use of the term in
divorce petitions increased. 19 Justice Daniel N.
Valentine, the presiding judge, criticized older
interpretations that had "taken too low and
sensual a view of marriage relations," and he
called for courts to move to "a higher plane, and
to consider it [marriage] as a mental and spiritual relationship, as well as physical relations."
His response paralleled society's demand that
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men ought to be aware of women's keener
domestic, religious, and moral position and
treat wives accordingly. Extreme cruelty,
whether physical or mental, had reached the
front line attack in most women's petitions by
1900. Men, too, apparently on the assumption
that what is good for the goose is good for the
gander, sometimes included the charge in their
petitions, as did Charles L. Clemons who "suffered great mental anguish ... which affected
him mentally and physically" (3182, see also
3422). Abandonment, adultery, drunkenness,
and failure to perform the duties of a spouse
were all coupled with accusations of extreme
mental cruelty and generally were met by a
sympathetic court.
"Seventh, fraudulent contract." This was another of the rarely used causes for granting a
divorce. There was only one clear use of the
seventh cause. Mattie Hoard claimed that she
had been "induced to enter into marriage by
reason of fraud" when her husband concealed
from her how many children (six) he still had
from his first marriage (3611). Helen Hubbell
told the court that her husband had claimed
before their marriage that he owned a business
but he did not, and she had been forced to work
as a servant to survive. She did not rely on this
circumstance as a major contention in her case,
however, but, like most others, fell back on
"mental distress, ... gross neglect of duty; [and]
extreme cruelty" (3710). Lavina Shortridge,
who was barely sixteen when she married Ira,
age forty-four, might have pled a flawed marriage contract when, shortly after their wedding, he brought what he claimed was his own
illegitimate child into the house, but she also
called on the same old reliables that Helen
Hubbell had listed (3722). The seventh cause
was largely ignored because of other clearer,
more useful grounds.
"Eighth, habitual drunkenness." Instances of
liquor and habitual drug use were frequently
cited by petitioners but drunkenness was rarely
used as the only cause for the suit. The emotional response stirred by the temperance movement made drunkenness a statutory cause for
divorce in Maine in 1838. In Dodge, an open-
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saloon town long after Kansas was legally dry,
the fact that a person was at "divers times ...
under the influence of liquor" was used in a
successful petition for divorce as early as 1875
(34). In most courts habitual drunkenness was
seen as a clear threat to the wife's moral guardianship, a corruption of family values, and an
abasement of marriage roles. 20 Henrietta Collins
reported her husband came home "on divers
times" drunk, "misused and abused" her but she
did not charge habitual drunkenness, using his
drinking as only an example of his failure to
conform to the acceptable role of husband (34).
Others did use the term habitual to describe an
intolerable condition. The use of drugs, particularly morphine, was cited in a number of
cases as the reason for the dissolution of the
marriage. In one of the most shocking cases,
Carrie DeVoe Wright, after barely a year of
marriage, petitioned the court for divorce on
many grounds but included the charge that
Robert M. Wright was "a habitual user of drugs,
such as morphine, bromidia and chloral" (3 702).
Since Wright was one of the foremost citizens
of the town, the outcome of the trial must have
been sensational, but no mention of the nature
of the trial appeared in the newspaper, and the
judge, in explaining his decision in favor of the
plaintiff, alluded only to adultery and neglect of
duty.
"Ninth, gross neglect of duty." This rather
nebulous and undefined phrase was cited as
cause in fifty-seven cases. If the term on the
surface appears to lack clear definition, society
had worked out the general limits of the duties
for husband and wife by 1875. Philosophically,
the line was so clearly drawn that women were
said to occupy a "separate sphere." Actual dayto-day living was less separated than the ideal
would suggest; still, the domestic model was
clear enough that husbands and wives brought
suit defending the accepted domestic standards.
Because the home was considered the very
foundation of the Victorian social order, its
preservation was assumed to have paramount
importance. 21 Courts, even in cattle towns, took
seriously the obligation of maintaining the institutional family, a task that recognized the
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powerful ideological prescriptions of roles and
duties.
The plaintiff had to establish that he or she
was well aware that both partners in a marriage
held obligations that, if broken, would result in
dissolution of marriage. The standard form of
the plaintiffs petition began by stating the fact
of a marriage and proof of residence within the
court's jurisdiction, followed immediately by a
declaration that the plaintiff had fulfilled the
proper duties of the union, using such expressions as "performed all and singular duties ... as
a faithful, obedient and loving wife" (99) or a
"dutiful, good and loyal husband" (87). These
validations of the right to contest the marriage
were in turn followed by a listing of specific
causes for the action. A counter suit followed
the same pattern of professing adherence to
proper role and contradicting charges to the
contrary. The cause or causes for divorce had to
be of such severity that, as Arilla Steel said of
her union, the marriage was "just the opposite of
what law and society created it for" (3089), and
thus must be abolished.
The details of neglect were usually presented
to the court in the individual's own words rather
than some formalized phrase supplied by an
attorney. Women were charged with neglecting
the duties of motherhood: "a wicked and corrupt woman ... unfit to have care ... of young
children" (3089), "the child [was] running
around the streets" unattended (87); of being
extravagant or foolish in the use of money and
always "after him" with "demands for large sums
of money" (3280, 3523); of refusing to do the
normal housewifely tasks of cooking, cleaning,
and sewing because she was "away gadding
around town" (3797); of persisting in "sexual
denial ... for more than three months refused to
have sexual intercourse" (3280); and of failing
to provide a supportive, warm, and caring relationship by being "neglectful, cold, cross, unkind and cruel" (2843). Men were charged with
being "cross, irritable, cursed and swore" (2395);
of failing to provide the necessities of life when
he "refused to pay any debts contracted for
necessaries, [and] warns merchants not to [give
me] credit" (3702); of demanding excessive

and "beastly" sexual conduct when the wife was
"forced to submit to intercourse 2 or 3 times a
day" (3747); and refusing to provide protection
when "he hired witnesses to swear against her
and ruin her reputation" (3702).
Gross neglect proved to be a bottomless pit of
complaints. When combined with other causes
a dreary picture of domestic quarrels and hatred
emerges. Obviously, both male and female egos
suffered in telling of their inability to achieve
the idealized harmony the Victorian family
model required, but by the time events had
forced a public dissolution, battered egos long
since had been dealt with, and individuals had
braced themselves for unpleasant social reaction.
"Tenth, the conviction of a felony and imprisonment in the penitentiary therefore subsequent to the marriage." There are no recorded
instances of the use of this cause in the Dodge
City court.
Mary Sawyer's venture into legal depths pitted her against a man with considerable property who hired the town's three leading attorneys to defend his interests.zz Her attorney,
Harry Gryden, known as the champion of the
underdog, made certain that due process was
observed. Summonses were delivered, depositions taken, and testimony examined and crossexamined. When Mary failed to secure what she
considered a just alimony, the case was reviewed a year later. As plaintiff, she was finally
granted a divorce, custody of her child, and a
small, lump-sum alimony. Justice? Perhaps not
pristine, but in light of the parochial nature of
the court and the local resources marshalled
against the petition, Mary Sawyer's mild victory
appears remarkable.
Mary might have been more willing to turn
to the local court if she had known that her
child's welfare would be a serious concern of the
court, and, furthermore, that she had an excellent chance of receiving custody of her child.
Nationally, women were granted custody three
times as often as husbands, and in Dodge City
the chances were even greater. The judges
generally seemed satisfied that the child's future
was secure when placed in the custody of the
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more stable of the marriage partners, regardless
of gender, not infrequently with child support
included. Husbands were required in a number
of instances to make monthly payments of fairly
significant sums, $10 or $15 a month, usually
with a time or amount limitation (3318). On
rare occasions both parents were involved in
the child's future through visitation rights and
other arrangements (3616, 3626, 3374). Occasionally, elaborate instructions were given for
the care and education of a dependent child, as
it was in the case of the infant son of Clara C.
and Theodore Von Burgh. In that instance,
guardianship was equally divided through six
months stays with each parent until the child
was of an age to choose one or the other parent,
or until one parent remarried, when all rights to
"Companionship and Guardianship" would be
forfeited. The boy was not to be sent "to any
school, academy, or institution of learning,
under the Auspices of any religious denomination or where he would be so trained" (2643).
In a few cases child custody was given to a third
party when both parents were considered unfit
(3525 ).
By 1900 the status of child custody decisions
in the district court in Ford County was consistent with Michael Grossberg's summary of the
situation in general throughout the United
States:
American custody law over the course of the
nineteenth century thus had rearranged spousal rights. Mothers gained new powers as
custody and guardianship rights became part
of the new legal domain of married women.
Through the best-interest-of-the-child doctrine and its offshoots, women won the right
to go to court, fight for, and often obtain their
children. The attorney Charles Savage took
note of the trend in the 1883 American Law
Register when he postulated that in all areas
of the law, "the irresistible movement is in
the direction of the most perfect legal equality of the married partners, consistent with
family unity." The caveat, however, hinted
at boundaries of the newly constructed maternal legal sphere.23
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As for the wife's welfare, the district court in
Ford County made alimony, child support, and
property settlements when warranted, although
alimony was not requested in most cases, and,
when granted, payments were generally limited
to $10 or $20 a month, or to a lump sum of $200
to $300. Considering that day laborers averaged
around $35 per month, the amounts were substantial enough to at least provide for a child's
well being until the mother could become established in a job or other living arrangement.
(The court did not always make a distinction
between payments of alimony and payments of
child support.) More affluent clients were frequentl y required to make more substantial single
payments (806, 3281). A case in point was
Carrie Rath's divorce from Charles Rath, reputedly Dodge's wealthiest entrepreneur. Charles
Rath initiated the suit, paid Carrie $4500 at
the time the petition was drawn, and was directed to pay $2500 more when the divorce was
granted, as well as $35 a month child support
until the child reached age fifteen (1064).
When property was involved, judges usually
provided for distribution of land, lots, and
goods. In cases involving homesteaders who
could show that the family's property was the
result of joint effort, provisions were made for
the wife and husband each to receive some
land, livestock, and household furnishings.
SuIt ina Averill received $240 "permanent alimony" and a quarter section of land (3375),
Carrie Philips was awarded thirty head of cattle
and two horses (807), and Ernestina Wilson, a
town wife, received $750 and three lots (3749).
The financial settlements that stirred the
greatest bitterness did not favor women to the
same extent shown in the granting of divorces
and custody of children. Still, wives were not
always left destitute or on their own resources if
there was property to be claimed.
The protection extended to Mary Sawyer
and other female petitioners by male judges in
a clearly male-dominated society that prided
itself on being freer and less regimented than
settled Eastern communities reflects an enlightened and perhaps unexpectedly advanced
perception of individual rights. The very nature
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of local judicial proceedings, however, was a
liberalizing influence in interpreting the state's
bare-bones provisions for divorce. When all
the cases in the Dodge City court are reviewed,
the trend toward expanding the rights and
duties of all members of a family is apparent.
Even more remarkable, the judges assumed an
almost unlimited patriarchal control of family
relationships once they came under the court's
authority.24
Throughout the Victorian period, some
people saw the growing authority of local courts
as endangering family stability. "We do not
recognize the Family at all in our National
Constitution," lamented the Reverend Samual
Dike, a leading advocate of uniform divorce
codes. "Weare purely individualistic .... The
perils of democracy in the domestic institutions
are part of the price we pay for our political
system."25 In the matter of Sawyer v. Sawyer and
other contested divorces, the persistent localism that resisted national codes was changing
the conception of the family. Husbands retained the greater share of assets, probably
because in their role as family providers they
had managed and controlled the various holdings. In at least one instance the husband was
given the option of purchasing property
awarded the wife (3490). The male domination
of local courts may have affected these financial decisions. Male judges seemed far more
interested in seeing women removed from unfortunate, unsuccessful, and unacceptable marriages than in punishing husbands through material awards to the freed spouse. Preserving
Victorian roles of husband and wife apparently
weighed heavily in judicial decisions.
As I have noted elsewhere: "The law of any
community comes to represent just about what
society considers convenient, proper, or profitable at the moment."26 For Dodge Citians, the
liberalizing pressures of societal conscience regarding gender roles and responsibilities had
brought changes and new protections to the
individual members of a family. The piecemeal
decisions of local courts codified grassroots expressions of values and familial duties in the
creation of the family as a collection of distinct

legal personalities, including women and children, with enhanced rights as well as responsibilities. What was true for the rest of the United
States, especially in the West, was true for Mary
Sawyer in Dodge City and reflected the unexpected sophistication of a region many Americans considered scarcely civilized and certainly
isolated from Eastern judicial niceties.
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